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Positive ramifications of the integration of the European Union have been studied since 
the supranational institution was founded. In the twenty-first century, Europe has been faced 
with a migration crisis that has lead to a rise in xenophobia, anti-immigration movements, and 
far-right parties.  This research seeks to learn more about far-right party social media 
communication tactics in the EU, and how parties can benefit from the interconnected political 
geography that exists in the EU.  In order to do this, this study compares the Facebook 
communication tactics of the EU example of Wallonia (Belgium) to a similar, non-EU example 
of Quebec (Canada).  These two regions have many similarities and present themselves as great 
candidates to use the most-similar case design. 250 Facebook posts are analyzed from a far-right 
party in each of the two regions: La Meute from Wallonia and Démocratie Nationale from 
Quebec.  Quantitative analysis provides some basic differences between the two groups.  Critical 
discourse analysis is used to find deeper meanings in the Facebook posts. This research found 
that La Meute does not benefit from a similar interconnected political geography like Démocratie 
Nationale does with the European Union. Thus, La Meute’s Facebook posts referenced their own 
party at a much higher rate than Démocratie Nationale’s posts. It was also found that Démocratie 
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 In the years following World War II, the countries of Europe began to work together in 
promoting peace and European economic development. Since the beginning of this “European 
Project” that ultimately lead to the creation of the European Union, scholars, politicians, and 
other Europeans have been asking how these countries, which such diverse and rich histories, are 
going to be able to work together in order to reach a multitude of common goals? There 
continues to be much debate among theorists, but it is no longer merely a question of integration 
amongst European countries. With an increase in refugees and migrants, integration now needs 
to address the effectiveness in integrating refugees and migrants into the European societies.  
As immigration increases in a society, so too does xenophobia. These types of reactions 
have lead to the increased presence of far-right parties in some European countries.  Golder 
indicates that the “far right party family is the fastest-growing party family in Europe (Golder 
477).   The New York Times reports that in parliamentary elections of twenty EU countries, 
fifteen countries have experienced an increase in electoral gains by right wing and far-right 
parties from 2000-20161 (Aisch et al.). Many far-right parties are perceived as a threat towards 
the effectiveness of integration. We must look at the tactics, messages, and inner-workings of 
far-right parties, as well as their collaboration and strengthening with other similar groups in 
order to better move forward in addressing these issues. The ultimate goal of European 
integration is to increase harmony amongst the countries. This thesis examines the tactics and 
collaboration of two far-right parties by comparing their tactics of posting and sharing in their 
own public Facebook groups.  
																																																								
1	Three countries had a decrease in electoral wins by right wing and far-right parties and two countries had no 
change.		
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This study is comparing the effectiveness of integration between Quebec and Wallonia by 
looking at the tactics of two far-right parties in these similar regions in order to see how 
internationalization impacts the functioning of these two groups.  Looking at the outcomes of 
this enhanced or lessened communication can help give insight into the level of integration. 
Wallonia and Quebec are being examined due to their numerous similarities as regions. In order 
to learn more about the European Union, we can look to a EU example, Wallonia, and compare it 
with a very similar, but non-EU example of Quebec.  
 There is a great deal of academic research relating to the effects that far-right parties have 
on integration.  However, less studied are the messages and tactics that these groups use in order 
to gain support of the inhabitants of the region.  This research will address the tactics and 
messages of far-right parties and how different far-right parties use and share the resources and 
messages of other similar groups to enhance their anti-integration messages.  
Far-right parties often use the fear of foreigners in attempts to create negative sentiments 
towards foreigners arriving in Europe. In 2007, Daniel Férét, the then leader of the Front 
National in Wallonia – who was ultimately kicked out of his own party – said that in 15 years, 
“Brussels will be under Islamic law” (Barker). Férét is using the logic that if it can happen 
elsewhere, it can happen here, in order to instill fear in the Walloon population. This is a tactic 
that far-right parties use in order to create domestic fear by sharing foreign examples. 
 Many far-right parties exist in Europe that have differing levels of presence, strength and 
effectiveness of their messages. Therefore, we must compare them to similar, non-European 
example in order to better analyze the situation in Europe. By using the instructive case of 
similar regions of Quebec and Wallonia, we can gain insight into how the spatial proximity and 
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political geography in the EU play an important role in the diffusion of information and ideas, 
compared to a more isolated group in Quebec.   
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Literature Review 
The study of far-right parties, tactics of far-right parties and the communication amongst 
political parties have been large topics of research for many decades, as well as the consequences 
of European integration in terms of communication. This research analyzes how far-right parties 
utilize this European communication network – resulting from integration – in order to 
collaborate with each other by sharing ideas and messages. It questions how far-right parties use 
this communication network as compared to far-right parties that do not benefit from a similar 
supranational communication and connectivity network in their region. The goal is to compare a 
similar EU far-right party with a non-EU far-right parties in order to learn more about this 
communication in the EU.  
Defining the party family 
 In order to understand how these parties communicate, we must first identify the far-right 
party family. Mudde argues that the concept of a party family, such as the right-wing extremist 
parties, is largely determined on the basis of the party ideology (Mudde 2). The foundation for 
this classification is based off of two ideological criteria: “the name of the party, and, when this 
is not (or no longer) satisfactory, the voters’ perception of party programmes and ideological 
position” (Mudde 2). This classification is performed by the party itself or of the voters; 
therefore “it is not the researcher who assesses the ideology of the different parties” (Cas Mudde 
2). Using Mudde’s reasoning, both La Meute and Démocratie National are classified as far-right 
parties because of the perception of their ideologies, which align them with the far-right party 
family. The presence and increase of extreme-right parties come in waves (Mudde 6). Mudde 
states that “studies of a single party can also provide important and useful data for cross-national 
studies on party families” (Mudde 183). He continues, “the categorization of political parties 
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according to broader families has by now become a more or less standard procedure in the 
numerous cross-national studies of political parties” (Mudde 183).  Golder expands upon 
Mudde’s research and determines that there are three types of grievances that create demand for 
far-right parties: modernization grievances, economic grievances, and cultural grievances 
(Golder 482). In the realm party families, it is apparent that La Meute and DN are both groups 
belonging in the same far-right party family. We will next examine some of the research on the 
characteristics of far-right parties. 
Far-right parties in general 
There has been a great deal of research that has been conducted that examines far-right 
parties as well as explaining the different levels of support for different far-right parties.  Allen 
states that immigration is the leading issue amongst far-right parties in Western Europe (Allen 
282). Bos and Van Der Brug outline three major factors that often determine the levels of 
support for these parties. First, is the demand: whether individuals in society find a need for such 
a party to arise (Bos and Van Der Brug 779).  Second, they acknowledge that their needs to be a 
competitive context, meaning that the political climate offers an opportunity for a party to make 
a difference (Bos and Van Der Brug 792). The third factor is the characteristics of the party itself 
(Bos and Van Der Brug 792).  
Mudde distinguishes extremism and radicalism by indicating that radicalism is opposed 
to the constitution, whereas extremism is hostile towards the constitution (Mudde 12).  Bos and 
Van Der Brug explain that parties that “outright reject the existing democratic system” are much 
less likely to be successful as compared to parties that “accept the system but propose reform,” 
or in other words, “it has to be efficacious to vote for a certain party” (Bos and Van Der Brug 
779). Carter agrees that the differences between right-wing parties needs to be acknowledged and 
 6 
that extreme-right parties, like neo-Nazi parties, are less successful in elections because parties 
that reject the democratic system in place are less successful than parties that propose reforms to 
the current democratic system (Carter 58). Carter also finds that the extreme-right parties “are 
more likely to experience success if a strong level of internal party discipline exists within them 
that minimizes dissent, and that fosters internal party cohesion and coherence” (Carter 65). The 
explanation for this amongst the literature is that voters will choose to not “support a party that 
they perceive as undemocratic or too extremist,” which is fueled by the perceived legitimacy of 
party leaders (Bos and Van Der Brug 792). Bos and Van Der Brug’s research supports the view 
that voters of anti-immigration parties use the same standards to evaluate the party that they 
would in evaluating other parties, so legitimacy and effectiveness are “necessary, but not 
sufficient, preconditions” for a party to be successful (Bos and Van Der Brug 793).  Hooghe and 
Dassonneville also find that “low levels of political trust are associated with a preference for a 
protest party” (Hoogh and Dassonneville 124).  Hooghe and Dassonneville acknowledge that in 
order to better understand how these shifting attitudes of trust affect political behavior, we must 
also look at changing attitudes of the society (Hoogh and Dassonneville 124). Many researchers 
have written on the defining characteristics of far-right parties, but what tactics do far-right 
parties use in order to become more successful? 
Far-right tactics 
 Far-right parties play off of the fear of immigrants and foreigners in order to push their 
agenda and increase their support.  Increased economic and political instability, as well as an 
increase in refugee and migrants, allows the far-right to gain leverage in the European Union 
(Doerr 4). Doerr points to three main strategies that the far-right has used to increase their 
presence in the EU: they have “modernized their political discourse,” “mainstreamed their 
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programs,” and they play upon the “fear and resentment of immigrants” (Doerr 4). Doerr 
explains that all far-right parties “share the systematic strategy of visual or symbolic media 
provocation that speaks to multiple audiences” and that the use of images reinforces “anti-
immigrant discourse” (Doerr 4). La Meute and Démocratie Nationale (DN) often share images or 
news articles that contain images that provoke anti-immigrant sentiments, which helps them 
leverage an anti-immigration population. Doerr demonstrates that many anti-immigration images 
shared by far-right groups do not need to be translated: the image talks for itself (Doerr 20). 
Since anti-immigration images often do not need translation, this allows for cross-national 
sharing of content between far-right parties.   
Muis and Immerzeel note that the common attributes of far right parties is their 
“exclusionist, ethno-nationalist notion of citizenship,” meaning that “states should be inhabited 
exclusively by members of the native group” and that the native groups are threatened by non-
native groups (Muis and Immerzeel 910). Mudde argues that populism and authoritarianism also 
define this party family (Mudde 182) and Muis and Immerzeel continue that “populism is a 
communication style or ‘thin’ ideology” that creates a “division between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Muis 
and Immerzeel 910). In order for far-right parties to effectively implement these tactics, the party 
leaders must have certain qualities. 
Far-right leadership 
There has been a great deal of research on the qualities of leaders in successful far-right 
parties.  Lubbers, et al. states that a “leader is the group incarnate,” meaning that the “group finds 
its common ideal in this leader” (Lubbers, et al. 251).  Lubbers, et al. continues to say to 
authoritarian leaders fulfill their followers’ “need to subordinate to powerful people in order to 
relieve experiences of fear” (Lubbers, et al. 352). Muis and Immerzeel write about far-right 
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leadership and what can lead to success of the party based on leadership. Muis and Immerzeel 
indicate that “many leaders rely almost entirely on media attention, and successful trajectories 
often illustrate how media visibility can compensate for organizational weakness” (Muis and 
Immerzeel 916).  
Johansson identifies three patterns amongst the organization of populist parties.  First, he 
identifies that these parties have a hierarchical structure dominated by a small group of 
individuals at the top (Johansson 36). Lubbers, et al. agrees with Johansson that far-right parties 
usually gain authority “as a consequence of the hierarchical organization of the party” (Lubbers, 
et al. 251). Secondly, Johansson identifies personalized leadership as a commonality amongst 
populist party organization (Johansson 37). Muis and Immerzeel also point to “charismatic 
leadership” as another “prominent supply-side explanation” for success of parties (Muis and 
Immerzeel 917). Johansson identifies the third pattern among populist parties to be “factionalism 
or intra-party division,” because these parties are “prone to internal conflicts, strife, and splits” 
(Johansson 38).  We observe this factionalism in the example of Démocratie Nationale, which 
was formerly the Front National in Belgium, a splinter group of the Front National in France. 
Golder points out that “national-level support for the far right hides significant subnational 
variation” (Golder 491).  Golder identifies strong party organization as an important factor to far 
right party success (Golder 486). Part of this party organization includes far-right parties having 
many branches in order to “gain experience and test campaign tactics” (Golder 486). Golder 
claims that within the context of strong party organization, having a “professional and permanent 
staff helps portray the party as competent, reliable, accountable and predictable” (Golder489). La 
Meute and DN both use these tactics in order to convey a united voice and message.  
Proximity in terms of party cooperation  
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The success of far-right parties been researched by many scholars who have identified 
common tactics among many far-right parties, which often include an element of connectivity. 
Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner, part of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a London-based think 
tank, published their findings in a report about “connectivity, convergence and mainstreaming of 
the extreme right” (Davey and Ebner). One of their key findings is that “extreme-right groups 
across the globe are actively collaborating to achieve common goals” (Davey and Ebner 3). This 
research paper examines how the EU works as a vehicle for cross-party communication among 
far-right parties.  
Davey and Ebner acknowledge the collaboration between far-right groups, who use 
online platforms to “provide mechanisms for transnational knowledge exchange, fundraising and 
coordinated information operations” (Davey and Ebner 3).  Davey and Ebner found that far-right 
groups, “actively seek to overcome ideological and geographic divergences for the sake of 
expanding their influence, reach and impact” (Davey and Ebner 3).  Davey and Ebner cite that 
historically, these parties have been “fragmented and leaderless” (Davey and Ebner 4).  
However, this fragmentation and disaggregation of far-right parties by reason of conflicting 
ideologies has changed in the past decade.  Davey and Ebner explain that this change can be 
attributed to the Internet, which has provided a “melting pot for different sub-cultures and 
smaller movements, facilitating global exchange and cooperation within likeminded groups and 
opportunistic allies across the globe” (Davey and Ebner 4-5).  This phenomenon has resulted in 
the all-encompassing idea of the “alt-right” in the United States, whereas in Europe, the 
“identitarian movement” has experienced “increased connectivity across national borders” 
(Davey and Ebner 5). Identitarians use an exploitation of common grievances, such as “identity 
and mass immigration and shared goals” in order to “appeal to a wide range of audiences and 
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cement a more cohesive ideology” (Davey and Ebner 10). Davey and Ebner use the case study of 
the Defend Europe campaign, in which far-right supporters across Europe collaborated in order 
to “charter a ship with the aim of disrupting the flow of migrants crossing from Libya” (Davey 
and Ebner 10). The Defend Europe case study demonstrates how many different far-right groups 
collaborated across Europe in order to act on a common ideology. Davey and Ebner use the term 
“platform convergence” to describe the “new collaboration opportunities arising from alternative 
platforms” such as online meeting points, which have allowed for this cross-border collaboration 
(Davey and Ebner 25). We will see how La Meute and DN differ in their cross-border 
collaboration with other far-right parties.  
Davey and Ebner warn that “without the development of novel counter-strategies it is 
likely that the extreme-right will continue to flourish on these platforms, creating more cohesive 
communities which collaborate to support coordinated online raids which disseminate extremist 
content to mainstream platforms and high-profile offline activism” (Davey and Ebner 26). The 
collaboration of these groups is often due to grievances and victimhood narratives (Davey and 
Ebner 26). This is the case for DN; they use examples of grievances and victimhood – perceived 
victims of radical Islam – in order to come together with other groups.  This is also the case for 
La Meute and far-right parties in general.  
Davey and Ebner note that even many non-Identitarian groups also benefited from the 
cross-Europe collaboration by using the media attention from the campaign as a platform for 
their own attention. Davey and Ebner conclude that the Defend Europe case “demonstrates how 
groups and individuals are prepared to put aside ideological differences which have previously 
caused divisions and ruptures in the extreme-right ecosystem and instead focus on commonality” 
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(Davey and Ebner 11). The Defend Europe case study demonstrates how political party 
cooperation has been successful for the far-right.  
Connectivity 
The idea of spatial proximity plays an important role in this cross-nation communication 
and collaboration between groups with similar goals. Hoekman, et al. explain that those “that are 
in close vicinity interact more intensively than those at a distance” (Hoekman, et al. 662).  
However, long-distance collaboration activities have become more common with the “recent 
advances in information and telecommunication technologies,” such as social media (Hoekman, 
et al. 662). Hoekman, et al. cites two main reasons for this long-distance collaboration: it saves 
on costs infrastructure and it “generates intellectual benefits through the cross-fertilization of 
ideas” (Hoekman, et al.).   
 Littler and Feldman share the idea of cordon sanitaire, stating that under it, “groups or 
individuals associated with extreme political positions are either formally or informally deprived 
of any media platform” (Littler and Feldman 512). However, with the “development of a culture 
of news ‘sharing’ on social media,” many populist groups have been able to overcome the 
cordon sanitaire and “the number of routes to public engagement have thus dramatically 
increased” (Littler and Feldman 513). Littler and Feldman conclude that right wing anti-
immigration groups have had continued growth despite the cordon sanitaire due to “the role of 
social media in facilitating the violation of the cordon sanitaire” (Littler and Feldman 519). The 
cordon sanitaire is also used by other political parties, in terms of coalitions, at the regional, 
national and supranational levels. Opposing parties can work together in order to block far-right 
parties, just as traditional media has historically done.  
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Johnson and Kaye establish that since the rise of journalism on the Internet, “individuals 
spouting their views often appeared as credible” even for those that are “hosted by reliable 
sources” (Johnson and Kaye 624).  These sites often “lacked editorial oversight and did not have 
the professional and social pressures to provide accurate and unbiased information” (Johnson and 
Kaye 624).  Johnson and Kaye site studies of mainstream media that “suggest that the more 
people rely on the media for news and information, the more they will judge that information as 
credible” (Johnson and Kaye 624). For far-right parties, as in the examples of La Meute and DN, 
we can assume that, even if their Facebook posts cite biased sourced, according to Johnson and 
Kaye, the more that supporters rely on their pages for information, the more they will believe the 
information is credible, even if it is not. Johnson and Kaye found that “political trust” was a 
strong “predictor of credibility of online newspaper” news and that “strong partisans tended to 
judge online media as believable” (Johnson and Kaye 626).  
Political Geography: The European Union 
 In diving deeper into the field of connectivity, scholars demonstrate that political 
geography plays a large role in spatial proximity.  One of the most notable modern researchers of 
political geographers is Dr. John A. Agnew. Agnew, et al. explains that: 
For us, political geography is about how barriers between people and their political 
communities are put up and come down; how world orders based on different geographic 
organizing principles (such as empires, state systems, and ideological-material 
relationships) arise and collapse; and how material processes and political movements are 
re-making how we inhabit and imagine the world political map. (Agnew, et al. 2)  
In other words, political geography studies both the consequences of political processes, as well 
as the ways that the political processes are affected by geographic structures. One area of 
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political geography that is particularly interesting for this research is the one that “adopts a 
spatial-analytic perspective” in order to examine geographic patterns related to political parties in 
order to identify the spread of “democratic practices” (Agnew, et al. 4).  
 Kuus examines how this political geography works within the context of the European 
Union.  Kuss concludes that there is a “spatiality of knowledge production” that is not just “big 
picture assemblages,” but also within many sub-national communication networks (Kuss 284). 
We also learn from Kuss that “geographical proximity” plays a role in the perception of 
“authenticity and validity over other places” (Kuss 284).  Kuss demonstrates that when 
information is shared among groups within the same political geography, the perceived validity 
of this information is greater.   
Kuss also finds that information that is being spread by a group is “intimately bound” 
with the position of the speakers, and therefore with rest of their group as well (Kuss 285). By 
applying Kuss’s findings to far-right parties, we see that “when individuals say that an issue is 
not controversial, what they really communicate is that the point is not controversial in their 
circles” (Kuss 285). This means that when a far-right party makes claims, their perceived 
expertise is “understood in part through geographical analogies and metaphors,” such as sharing 
stories from other far-right parties that have similar controversial views (Kuss 285). As 
demonstrated by Kuss, however, these views are not seen as controversial because they are using 
a wide breadth of cross-national examples. Agnew describes a similar principle by stating that, 
“political action may ultimately result form the acts of individuals, but it is best explained by 
reference to the social contexts in which those individuals carry on their everyday lives” (Agnew 
204). Agnew indicates that the actions of political groups, such as which content they choose to 
share, depends on the individuals, but is best explained by the social context of those individuals 
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(Agnew 204).  This basic principle will be used throughout this paper in determining how the 




 Bearing in mind that social context and political geography affect the actions of political 
groups in addition to the individuals (Agnew 204), then what differences would we expect to see 
between a far-right party in a country that benefits from the political geography of the EU, such 
as Démocratie National in Wallonia, versus a far-right party in a country that does not benefit 
from a supranational political geography, like La Meute in Quebec? This section will theorize, 
based on the literature, what difference we will expect to see between the Facebook activity of 
DN and La Meute.  
This paper aims to answer the question of how does the communication of far-right 
parties change when influenced by surrounding far-right parties, such as the EU example of 
Wallonia, versus those that are acting without much outside influence, in the case of Quebec?  
Throughout the history of the European Union, goals of integration have been an integral aspect 
of the union (“The EU in Brief”). In order for the EU to progress, there have been recurring 
integration related goals, such as the economic goals to: “establish an economic and monetary 
union whose currency is the euro,” the movement goals to “offer freedom, security and justice 
without internal borders” (“The EU in Brief”) and communications goals, such as foreign 
language acquisitions goals of “speaking other languages helps people from different cultures 
understand one another - essential in a multilingual, multicultural Europe” (“Multilingualism”). 
The European Union has brought about a closeness among countries that has resulted in many 
connections being established for the development and advancement of the union. This paper 
will examine how the closeness experienced in the European Union has affected the far-right 
party in Wallonia’s experiences due to proximal far-right parties.  This paper, in general, 
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theorizes that without the continual integration seen in the European Union, the success of 
interconnectivity of La Meute with other far-right parties will not be as possible.  
 This question is really looking at the role of distance and communication in far-right 
party connectivity. Due to the proximity and connectivity offered from the EU, as explained by 
Agnew and Kuss, I hypothesize that Wallonia will have greater cooperation and closeness with 
far-right parties from surrounding EU-countries compared to Quebec, which we expect will have 
less cooperation with surrounding far-right parties. The reasoning for this hypothesis is that 
Wallonia has more established communication lines with other far-right parties, due to the 
vehicle that the European Union has provided, as compared to Quebec, which is considered more 
isolated and lacks a supranational integrated entity.  
According to Doerr, anti-immigration images can be shared cross-nationally and evoke 
similar messages without the use of translation. Davey and Ebner explain that far-right groups 
are actively communicating in order to achieve mutual objectives.  Due to these occurrences, this 
paper hypothesizes that strong communication networks between far-right parties will allow for 
more of the cross-national sharing of content described by Davey and Ebner. Therefore, we 
expect to see that DN, which has a strong communication network because of the European 
union, will have higher cross-national sharing than La Meute, which does not benefit from a 
similar connectivity network. The reasoning for this is that DN has this communication network 
that, according to Doerr and Davey and Ebner, will increase their communication with other 
groups, whereas La Meute does not benefit from such communication networks.  
 Since the creation of the European Union, many scholars have praised the continual 
integration and increase in communication amongst European citizens (“The EU in Brief”). This 
paper theorizes that if these EU networks allow more communication and connectivity among its 
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citizens, then should this not also hold true for far-right parties? In other words, cannot far-right 
parties exploit this communication network in order to propagate their hateful messages? In 
order to test this hypothesis, the communication tactics of a EU far-right party, DN, will be 
compared with a non-EU far-right party, La Meute. In order to make this comparison and test 
this hypothesis, it will need to be demonstrated that the two parties come from very similar 
regions or communities, but their communication tactics will need to differ. To confirm this 
hypothesis, it must be demonstrated that DN uses the interconnectivity of the EU and La Meute 
does not use a similar interconnected communication network and thus has less instances of 
online cross-party connectivity.  
For far-right parties to succeed, they must demonstrate to their supporters that there are 
similar-minded individuals elsewhere.  This project hypothesizes that groups like DN overcome 
and soften or mask this discrepancy by tapping into other far-right parties to show that there are 
similar-minded individuals elsewhere, which can strengthen their argument.  Conversely, it is 
theorized that La Meute does not have the outside-of-Quebec connections to tap into, and 
therefore have a weaker support.  Golder (2016) states that more progress in the field can be 
made “by paying more attention to the political geography of far right support” (Golder 493-94). 
This paper aims to examine the political geography, as described by Kuss and Agnew, by 
analyzing the communication networks of La Meute and DN. 
La Meute does not have access to a supranational system that can be used as a vessel for 
connecting them with surrounding far-right parties to the same extent that Démocratie Nationale 
does with the EU.  Using this information, this paper hypothesizes that La Meute will have 
significantly less posting that reference other countries due to a lack of a communal 
supranational system with the surrounding countries that would allow for communication or an 
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ongoing dialogue.  Conversely, La Meute does not have theses connections and commonalties 
and is therefore more isolated from potential far-right party collaboration, as compared to DN.  I 
also hypothesize that the La Meute Facebook posts will have more isolationist, self-referential 
types of posts than DN due to their geographic isolation. DN has many prominent far-right 
parties in the surrounding area, which is why I hypothesize that they will demonstrate more far-
right party collaboration.  
Davey and Ebner explain that in recent years, far-right groups have put aside some 
differences to achieve a commonality (Davey and Ebner 11).  We expect to see that Démocratie 
National, by means of the EU political geography, will share information from other, non-
identical, political parties in Europe who have common goals.  This is not to say that La Meute 
would not do this, but rather La Meute does not benefit from the same political geography that 
allows an interconnectivity to easily facilitate this type of sharing. 
Littler and Feldman found that social media has helped violate the notion of cordon 
sanitaire (Littler and Feldman 512).  Using this reasoning, I theorize that DN’s cross-party 
connectivity – due to the EU integration – has allowed them to violate the cordon sanitaire by 
utilizing this network in order to voice their views, as well as the views of far-right parties who 
share these common views. 
Since political geography, according to Kuss, demonstrates that perceived expertise of 
far-right party claims use their political geography to make commonly understood claims, far-
right parties use this connectivity of political geography in order to continue spreading their 
views. Agnew notes that although individuals make decisions in political tactics, it is ultimately 
the political geography that impacts these decisions. Therefore, in sum, I theorize that DN, who 
has the political geography of the European Union, will utilize the cross-national connections – 
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which contribute to this political geography – more than La Meute, which does not benefit from 




 In order to answer the research question, it must be demonstrated that Quebec and 
Wallonia are in fact two comparable regions.  Since this paper is examining the closeness of the 
EU and how this affects far-right parties, two comparable regions must be selected. This section 
will outline and describe the two selected regions: one that is part of the EU and one that is not. 
By comparing the communication tactics of two similar regions, we are able to better control the 
variable that proximity plays in the communication of far-right parties.  
I: Basic Information about Quebec and Wallonia & Similarities Between Them 
Wallonia and Quebec are quite similar regions, so it is interesting to examine the two in 
order to demonstrate many similar attributes for the case design. Wallonia is home to 3.5 million 
people who live in the southern region of Belgium, which as a whole has a population of around 
11 million (Cole 379). Similarly proportional, Quebec has a population of around 8 million as 
part of the eastern province of Canada, which is home to around 35 million (Behiels).  Wallonia 
and Quebec both represent similar population proportions compared to the rest of their country: 
the population of Wallonia is around 32% of the Belgian population (“The World Factbook – 
Belgium”) and the population of Quebec is around 23% of the Canadian population (“The World 
Factbook – Canada”). Both regions are the second largest sub-national regions in their respective 
countries by about one half: Wallonia is second to Flanders, which has a population of about 6.4 
million and Quebec is the second largest region after Ontario, which has a population of about 
13.6 million (Behiels). The two regions also have a similar GDP per capita. The Walloon region 
was about 33,000 USD (“Belgium: GDP”) compared to Quebec’s slightly larger GDP of 37,000 
USD (“Québec GDP”).  
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Both regions are home to majority French language speakers. The Walloons, who are 
predominantly Catholic, speak French, which differs from Flanders, which speaks Flemish (Cole 
379). Similar to Wallonia, a vast majority of the Québécois claims Catholicism as their religion 
(Behiels). French and English are both official languages of Canada, but, like Wallonia, French 
is the only official language of the Quebec province (Behiels).  French has been the official 
language of the Quebec province since 1974 and this was reaffirmed in Bill 101 of the Charter of 
the French Language in 1977 (Behiels).  In Canada, like Belgium, French is only the second 
largest language spoken in the country.  However, in both Wallonia and Quebec, French is by far 
the dominant language.  
 Belgium and Canada have similar government types and structures. Belgium is a 
parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy (Cole 379).  The Canadian 
government, formally Her Majesty’s Government, also has a federal parliamentary system under 
a constitutional monarchy (Sawe).  
Both Wallonia and Quebec have French roots, but have also been able to break apart in 
some aspects from these historic influences. The Walloons consume much French culture “by 
reason of shared language and geographic proximity,” but differ between from France, in that the 
French “are conscious of belonging to a country with a glorious history,” whereas the Walloons, 
“generally do not feel the same regarding Wallonia” (Cole 379). This is in part due to the 
boundaries of the region that have shifted frequently (Cole 379). Wallonia was not named so 
until 1844, which gives it a relatively new history compared to other European regions (Cole 
379). The Walloon Region, a political body, was not established until the revision of the Belgian 
Constitution in 1971 (Cole 379).  Wallonia experiences a relatively new history, which makes it 
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different from other European regions that have a deep history that is often instilled in its 
inhabitants.  
In search for a Walloon identity, André Lecours explains that Walloon governmental 
parties have included international mission statements, since politicians in Wallonia have found 
“fertile ground for identity-generating action/policies” in the “international sphere” (Lecours 97-
98). These politicians have found that by making international policies a priority there creates 
“notions of Walloon unity, distinctiveness and individuality” (Lecours 98). By federalizing 
Belgium, Lecours argues that Wallonia became more autonomous and was able to develop 
institutions that allowed for an international presence, which helped the region define the 
“economic and social interests specific to Wallonia” (Lecours 98).  
During the 1600s, the French colonized much of North America and named it New 
France (Behiels). The boundaries of Quebec, like Wallonia, changed many times until 1927 
when they remained the same until today (Behiels). Since the British acquired New France in 
1763, the francophone community has struggled “for survival and recognition as one of Canada’s 
founding peoples within a predominantly Anglophone…Canadian federation” (Behiels). Both 
Wallonia and Quebec have French roots, but have been able to somewhat remove themselves 
from French influence in the past century and establish their own sub-national cultures in their 
respective countries. 
II: Political Parties 
In addition to all of these similarities, Wallonia and Quebec have similar political party 
structures.  The most prominent far-right party in Wallonia is Démocratie Nationale (DN) and 
the most prominent far-right party in Quebec is La Meute.  
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Unlike La Meute where the region and language – Quebec and French – overlap 
agreeably, DN has a different situation. In Belgium, Brussels poses an blurry issue when it 
comes to regions and languages for DN; the French language region does not cover just 
Wallonia, it also covers some of Brussels.  For this reason, DN works at the community level – 
the French Community – so that they can talk with their compatriots in Brussels, rather than just 
Wallonia.  
Although both La Meute and DN have relatively recent histories under their current 
names and leadership, DN finds its roots in the Front National in France.  As a satellite party of 
the Front National in France, Daniel Féret established the Belgian Front National in 1985 and 
although it was “not nearly as strong or as organized as Vlaams Belang” in Flanders, it was the 
main far-right party in Wallonia and had close ties with the Front National in France (Barker). 
However, in 2011, the Front National in France sued the Front National in Belgium “to stop the 
party from using the name” (Aalberg, et al.). The party changed its name to Démocratie 
Nationale (DN), while also changing its logos and some of its leadership, and thus, the DN, as 
we know it today, began in 2011 (Aalberg, et al.). Only a few years later, two former Canadian 
veterans founded La Meute in 2015 (Montpetit). The founders created La Meute as a 
“hierarchical organization modeled on their military background,” and the group began to work 
almost exclusively online through a private Facebook group (Montpetit).  
 It is difficult to determine membership for La Meute and DN. Since both parties have 
aspects of their group that work in secrecy, it is difficult to determine an estimate for each 
group’s membership.  La Meute boasts that it gained 40,000 members in its first year, but this 
number just refers to members of their Facebook group and not necessarily true active members 
(Montpetit).  Neither La Meute nor DN claim membership numbers on their official websites 
 24 
(Santi) (“La Meute Officiel”). Electoral results can sometimes be a rough indicator of party 
support. However, La Meute has yet to participate in any elections.  For DN, we can look to their 
previous party, the Belgian Front National, which had its last electoral win in 2007 when they 
won just over 131,000 votes (“Far-Right Boss”).  
 Both La Meute and DN communicate amongst their members almost exclusively in 
French.  La Meute also communicates with the public almost exclusively in the French language.  
However, Démocratie Nationale’s official website offers translations in French, Dutch, German, 
English, Italian, Spanish, Hungarian and Russian (Santi), whereas La Meute only offers French 
(“La Meute Officiel”).  
 La Meute aims to “boycott halal products, circulate petitions against government policies 
that foster multiculturalism and post stories from little-known publications about the influence of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Quebec” (Montpetit). Similarly, DN has many anti-immigration and 
xenophobic ideals and messages.  
 In a study by Stier et al. they note that when they collected Facebook data from far-right 
groups, “our data do not contain posts and comments that had either been deleted by users, 
moderators of the political Facebook pages or by Facebook…therefore, the data set depicts the 
curated self-presentation and as a such the strategic considerations of political actors our research 
aims to reveal” (Stier et al. 1371). This project will have a similar attributes in the data set 
because of the ways the parties run their Facebook pages. Both La Meute and DN use their 
public Facebook pages to post in a unified manner. La Meute has their officers – who are the 
administrators of the Facebook page – do the posting. This might be a result of their insularity 
and internal organization structure. On the other hand, DN has analogs in other countries, so they 
might not have the need to post as individuals, which is demonstrated by their Facebook posts 
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being posted by the page itself, and not individuals. Nonetheless, both groups unite behind a 
generally unified voice and they both also censor the messages – on a social media platform 
group that is perceived to have freedom of ideas – by only allowing certain individuals to post.  
III: Most important difference: Distance 
In the most similar case design, the sole differentiating quality of interest is the 
independent variable. When discussing and analyzing regions, it is impossible to find two 
identical regions for a true most similar case design. As mentioned earlier in this section, 
however, Wallonia and Quebec present themselves as two very comparable regions. For this 
research, the geographic barrier is the independent variable.  Wallonia has close proximity to 
many nationalist parties that share the same language or country with them, whereas Quebec has 
the massive geographic barrier between itself and the majority of the Francophone world.  This 
project will examine the impact that this geographic barrier has on nationalistic influence of 
these two similar regions. 
In the case of Wallonia, it is observed that there is a relationship with France because of 
the same language and with Flanders due to similar ideologies and both being part of the same 
nation. Since Démocratie Nationale has roots in the French far-right party, the Front National, 
and since the two parties hare many ideologies, such as nationalism and strict control of 
immigration, these parties can benefit from each other by having the same roots (Ray).  
Démocratie Nationale also can benefit from the electoral successes of the French Front National.  
Under Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the party from 1972 to 2011, the Front National 
experienced many sizable electoral victories in the French government.  Under the leadership of 
Marine Le Pen, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s daughter, the French Front National finished first in 
European Parliament elections in 2014 with one fourth of the vote, and she came in second in the 
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French presidential elections in 2017 (Ray). The Front National in France is known for having 
strong anti-immigration messages, but the “party is prepared to soften its notoriously hard line 
against immigrants in the case of its francophone Belgian cousins” (Willsher). Le Pen explains 
that if Flanders declares its independence, which she believes is a possibility, then “the French 
republic would do well to welcome Wallonia to its heart” (Willsher). This demonstrates that 
France considers Walloons to be more French than it does for other nationalities. Le Pen explains 
this strong connection is due to “historic and fraternal links that unite our two people,” and that 
there connections are “too strong for France to abandon the Walloons” (Willsher). 
Wallonia experiences strong relationships with surrounding regions. However, in 
Quebec, these types of relationships are not found. In terms of a relationship with other parts of 
Canada, language is a large barrier.  Desrochers indicates that Québec is often defined as “a 
nation within the nation-state of Canada” which is further exemplified through the common 
Québec expression, “maîtres chez nous” or “masters in our own home.” (Desrochers 3).  
Throughout Quebec’s history as a British colony, never “has Québec behaved like, or been 
treated as, other provinces” (Desrochers 5). Some historians believe that the francophone 
population was “already recognized as a ‘distinct people’” dating back to the British North 
America Act of 1867 (Desrochers 5).  
Canada only shares a border with the United States, as demonstrated in Image	1, whereas 
Belgium shares a border with France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, as 
demonstrated in Image	2. In terms of surrounding political parties, Démocratie Nationale (DN) 
has many prominent parties that are part of regions or countries that are geographically close. 
These parties do not just exist in secretive or online forums, but rather, many of them are 
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Image 1: Far-right Parties Surrounding Quebec 
 
Source: Wikipedia. Coloring and logos added by myself.  
Image 2: Far-right Parties Surrounding Wallonia 
 
Source: Wikipedia. Coloring and logos added by myself.  
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legitimate parties that have a track record of electoral success to prove it.  Vlaams Belang, a far-
right party in Flanders, has continued to have electoral success in the Regional Parliament, the 
Belgian Federal Parliament, and the European Parliament (Deloy).  The Front National in 
France, the far-right party that DN developed out of, has had continued success in elections, like 
Vlaams Belang. DN and the French Front National can also benefit from each other due to the 
shared language. In Germany, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has also experienced electoral 
success in the twenty-first century in the State Parliament, Federal Parliament and European 
Parliament (Hawley). In the past decade, the Nationalist party in the Netherlands, Partij voor de 
Vrijheid, has consistently obtained more than ten percent of the vote in the House of 
Representatives and Senate as well as the European Parliament (Foster, et al.). It is clear that DN 
is surrounded by multiple successful far-right parties. 
In the discussion of the effects of proximity on relationships of Quebec, it is important to 
also look at the case of the relationship between Quebec and the United States. While 
Démocratie Nationale in Wallonia is part of the European Union – the same representative 
system as Vlaams Belang (Belgium), the National Front (France), Alternative für Deutschland 
(Germany) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Netherlands) – La Meute in Quebec does not share a 
common representative system.  Quebec and the United States do not have a similar 
supranational cooperation similar to Wallonia and these other regions. For Quebec, the notion of 
a ‘distinct society’ separates them from the rest of Canada by language, culture and identity. One 
might point to proximal American far-right parties, such as the KKK, but there are many 
structural deficiencies that hinder proper coordination, such as language and representational 
structure. 
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 There exist other far-right parties in Canada outside of Quebec. However, unlike Vlaams 
Belang, for example, these parties have had very little electoral success (Heard).  Canadian 
Alliance, a right-wing party, only gained a small percentage of seats in the federal election of 
2000, so they merged with another conservative party in order to form a new party called the 
Conservative Party of Canada (Heard).  Even though the Concservative Party of Canada has 
often gained enough votes to become the opposition in the government, the Conservative Party 
of Canada has shifted on the political spectrum and is now considered to be between right and 
center-right (Heard), and therefore would not align ideologically with La Meute. The Nationalist 
Party of Canada, an unregistered far-right party, often receives only a fraction of a percent of the 
vote in Canada, and thus has not been a successful party in the surrounding region for La Meute 
(Heard). A summary of the similarities and differences between Wallonia and Quebec can be 
seen in Table	1. 
Table 1: Summary of Case Selection 
 Wallonia Quebec 
Country Belgium Canada 
Population 3.5 million 8 million 
Country Population 11 million 35 million 
Proportion of Country Population 32% 23% 
Sub-national Population 2nd (1/2 size of Flanders) 2nd (1/2 size of Ontario) 
Predominant Religion Catholic Catholic 
Region’s Dominant Language French French 
Country’s Dominant Language Dutch English 
Government Type Parliamentary 




Democracy under a 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
GDP Per Capita 33,000 USD 37,000 USD 
Roots in France Yes Yes 
Part of the EU Yes No 
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This paper theorizes that distance is the most important aspect when analyzing far-right 
party cooperation. While distance is important, there are other ways that distance manifests itself. 
This thesis is looking at shared borders and physical distance between regions, but there are other 
ways that distance expresses itself, such as different representation systems, the possibility of 
having cultural systems or language systems, and although these aspects are not specifically 
distance, they have relationships to distance that might result in disrupting or confusing the issue.  
Although these distinctions exist and matter, ultimately they should not make a difference and I 
still predict to see the results that I am expecting. 
 




In order to successfully answer the research question, this study will use a type of 
qualitative analysis as a method of research.  The type of qualitative analysis that will be used is 
critical discourse analysis by utilizing thick descriptions.  I will implement these methods by 
using the most similar case design. This specific type of qualitative analysis is important because 
this study is looking at Facebook posts from La Meute and Démocratie Nationale’s (DN) public 
Facebook groups. Although certain aspects of these posts will be quantified, thick descriptions 
are used to find deeper meaning when comparing the two cases in the most similar case design.  
This section will outline the justification for using the chosen research methods and why 
these methods are the best choices for this research question. Social media posts on Facebook 
will be used as data for this study, because it offers essential insight into the psychology of how 
these groups function internally and with the public and what types of collaborations are present 
with other groups. 
There are many different ways in which scholars can do research, often either by using 
qualitative or quantitative methods.  There are pros and cons to each method depending on the 
type of data collected and the aspects of the data that a researcher wants to focus on.  This paper 
will primarily deal with qualitative research methods.  
Dey explains that, “There is no one kind of qualitative data analysis, but rather a variety 
of approaches, related to the different perspectives and purposes of researchers” (Dey 1). 
Qualitative data deals with meanings, and “meanings are mediated mainly through language and 
action” and “meanings reside in social practice” (Dey 11-12).  Qualitative data “embraces an 
enormously rich spectrum of cultural and social artifacts” (Dey 13).  This research will rely on 
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qualitative data, because it is looking at the social practices of Facebook postings in order to 
derive meaning in the tactics and behaviors of far-right parties in Wallonia and Quebec.  
 This project is specifically examining abstract approaches to collaboration between 
groups.  Examples of this abstractness of research include the levels of support of different 
countries, the trickle-down effect of ideas and messages between groups and their willingness to 
be open with other groups. All of these approaches that are needed are culturally bound 
phenomena. For the purposes of answering this research question, examining Facebook posts 
will be more useful than conducting opinion polls, for example, because these posts tell a greater 
story about the culturally bound occurrences, which give more insight into the question at hand.  
Facebook post analysis allows a researcher to look at diction, context, content and word choice, 
which paint a picture of a group’s motive and levels of cooperation with other groups. Opinion 
polls evaluate hypothetical scenarios, whereas examining a Facebook posts give a truer insight 
into the passions and opinions of the poster about real scenarios in which they are engaged.  
 By using qualitative methods to look at Facebook posts instead of quantitative methods to 
examine opinion polls, we gain valuable insights into a larger culture and story about the 
communication of La Meute and DN.  In opinion polls, simple tallying and other quantifiable 
measures are used. However, for this project, other qualitative research methods must be 
implemented in order to better interpret the data.  
Critical discourse analysis allows researchers to create a “general framework for 
problem-oriented social research,” when “investigating complex social phenomena” (Baker et al. 
279-80). Van Dijk explains that unlike researchers using other types of discourse analysis, those 
using critical discourse analysis should “take an explicit sociopolitical stance: they spell out their 
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point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within society at 
large” (Van Dijk 252)2.  
In critical discourse analysis, “language is not powerful on its own – it gains power by 
the use people make of it and by the people who have access to language means and public fora” 
(Baker et al. 280). A researcher using critical discourse analysis should have aspirations with 
their research to create “change through critical understanding” (Van Dijk 252). This research 
hopes to gain valuable insights that can address and discuss issues related to far-right parties in 
Europe.  Van Dijk explains that critical discourse scholars are motivated by wanting to “make a 
more specific contribution, namely to get more insight into the crucial role of discourse in the 
reproduction of dominance and inequality” (Van Dijk 253). The theoretical and practical sides of 
critical discourse analysis both “focus on the structures of text and talk” (Van Dijk 259). Critical 
discourse analysis is used to examine groups that have the power to influence or persuade their 
audiences, and the role of a critical discourse analyst is to determine which “structures and 
strategies are involved” in the process of persuading and influencing their audiences (Van Dijk 
259). This power can be used by “access to certain public spheres” (Baker et al. 280) such as an 
approved poster – and administrator – in a public Facebook group. Continuing on the example of 
a Facebook group, “those groups who are in control of most influential public discourses,” as 
stated by Baker et al., which include the approved posters of the Facebook group, who “play a 
special role in the reproduction of dominant knowledge and ideologies in a society” (Baker et al. 
280). These groups use their power – being the only curated, self-presented strategic output voice 
of the Facebook group – to shape the way that others perceive them and the party. The 
administrators and posters in a censored group - like La Meute and DN – are, in essence, 
																																																								
2 Van Dijk recommends that for critical discourse analysis, a researcher should make their intentions known.  This 
research is examining the groupthink mentality and the echo-chamber of similar ideas effects that are observed in 
far-right party Facebook groups. 
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‘thought-leaders’. The messages and ideas that they post or choose to share are being used in 
exercises of thought persuasion.  These messages and opinions are meaningful, impactful and 
important for their group members. Unlike verbal communication, the role of a Facebook group 
administrator has power engrained in many components of it, which makes critical discourse 
analysis particularly appropriate and important here.  
Baker et al. defends using critical discourse analysis over “purely descriptive, data-driven 
approaches, which are epistemologically inadequate in accounting for the complex linguistic 
choices made during the processes of text production” (Baker et al. 281). Legislators, elected 
officials, and think tanks, for example, use critical discourse analysis to address large-scale 
societal issues. The goal of critical discourse analysis in this research, however, is to look at the 
small aspects of online far-right communication, where power is still important. Their power, 
however limited it may be, can still be examined – on a smaller scale – using critical discourse 
analysis. As the only individuals who have the power to make posts and delete comments, the 
Facebook administrators have the power over the followers because they are thought leaders and 
shape the discussion. In a context like Facebook, many users perceive it to be an open, free-
flowing conversation of ideas. When these members join groups, like La Meute’s or DN’s public 
groups, these individuals will perceive them to work in an open, censor-free environment like the 
rest of Facebook. However, the administrators are able to delete comments that do not coincide 
with the views of the group. Therefore, these administrators have a lot of censorship power in an 
arena that is perceived to be relatively censor free.  
Even though Facebook is a relatively new communication platform, it has become 
mainstream enough that scholars have acknowledged the importance of studying it, including the 
Facebook groups of far-right parties.  Stier et al. asserts that Facebook is a well-suited social 
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network platform for political parties because it is the “social network with the highest societal 
diffusion” (Stier et al. 1366).  Facebook allows fringe organizations to have a platform when 
they refuse to “talk to traditional media” and often provide insights into the “textual 
manifestation of its policy positions” (Stier et al. 1367).  Stier et al. demonstrate that for the 
German far-right group Alternative für Deutschland, there is a preference to use Facebook 
because there is a “higher degree of control that an owner of a Facebook page can exert,” 
whereas, “debates on Twitter are publicly open and not subject to moderation” (Stier et al. 1367). 
This holds true for La Meute and DN, which both have restrictions on who can post on their 
public Facebook pages. Facebook has a vast and extended presence on the social network realm, 
and therefore it is an ideal “data source to compare political communication” between different 
parties (Stier et al. 1371).  
Clifford Geerts cites Gilbert Ryle and his “thick description” as a methodology of social 
sciences based on “Thinking and Reflecting” and “The Thinking of Thoughts,” which will play 
an important role in analyzing the Facebook posts (Geerts 214). Ryle uses the example of two 
individuals who are “rapidly contracting the eyelids of their right eyes” where one has “an 
involuntary twitch” and the other has “a conspiratorial signal to a friend” (Geerts 214-15).  He 
continues to explain that from a phenomenalistic observation of the two individuals, the “two 
movements are, as movements, identical” (Geerts 215). A difference between the two cannot be 
made in terms of just phenomenalistic observations, however the difference “between a twitch 
and wink is vast” and although they have both contracted their eyelids, one of them has done an 
additional action: they have winked (Geerts 215). Ryle goes one step further and proposes a third 
individual who is parodying the second individual’s wink (Geerts 215). Through the example of 
twitching versus winking versus parodying a wink, Ryle demonstrates a “hierarchy of 
 36 
meaningful structures” (Geerts 215).  “This school of thought holds that culture is composed of 
psychological structures by means of which individuals or groups of individuals guide their 
behavior” (Geerts 218). “Culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, 
institutions, or processes can be casually attributed; it is a context, something within which they 
can be intelligibly – that is, thickly – described” (Geerts 218).  
In order to better find deeper meaning in the culture acting behind the message of far-
right groups, it will be most beneficial to use thick descriptions when observing these Facebook 
posts.  This will help determine not just surface-level aspects of the observable post, but rather it 
will help discover sub-text and deeper messages of these posts. One of the greatest strengths 
gained from using thick descriptions to analyze Facebook posts will be leveraging the content in 
order to acquire greater insight into answering the research question.  





 In Image	3, an approved administrator of the public La Meute Facebook page posts an 
article about Justin Trudeau’s history of crying in public.  The poster adds his own words to the 
post: “I almost shed a tear…” (translated).  On the surface, without any knowledge or deeper 
reading of the post or poster, one would interpret that the poster is sad and literally almost in 
tears.  However, if we use thick descriptions, we are able to find deeper meaning in the text and 
determine that the text is in fact sarcastic and mocking Trudeau and the article.  
 Once we have established that critical discourse analysis is an appropriate vehicle, we can 
now start to look at the decision to select two similar cases to compare.  
This study is not just observing Facebook posts, for example, but rather it is examining 
the posts in order to establish the grounds for a comparison between Quebec and Wallonia. It 
will do this by establishing a most similar case design in order to analyze these posts. 
The most similar method is “one of the oldest recognized techniques of qualitative 
analysis” and dates back to J.S. Mill’s System of Logic (1872) (Seawright and Gerring 305). The 
most similar method “employs a minimum of two cases” for analysis (Seawright and Gerring 
304). For the purest form of most similar case design “the chosen pair of cases is similar on all 
the measured independent variables, except the independent variable of interest” (Seawright and 
Gerring 304). However, when examining situations where exact matching is not possible, such as 
in the case with comparing two cultures, “researchers may employ approximate matching, in 
which cases from the control group that are close enough to matching cases from the treatment 
group are accepted as matches” (Seawright and Gerring 305). In the case of this experiment, 
qualities of Wallonia are the control group, and the treatment group is the qualities of Quebec.  
Since no two regions in the world will be the exact same across all criteria except one, as 
needed for the purest form of most similar case design, this project employs approximate 
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matching.  In the context of dealing with large groups of people, this methodology of 
approximate matching will be used to demonstrate how similar Wallonia and Quebec really are 
as far as two regions realistically can be.  Following the most similar case design, the variable of 
proximity for the two regions can be will be used in order to aid in answering the research 
question. As discussed in the previous section, we saw that there exists a multitude of similarities 
between Wallonia and Quebec across many different aspects of the regions.  The differences that 
we are examining, such as distance and isolation, are such that we have a great deal of leverage 
on the research question. In other words, Wallonia and Quebec are very similar except for the 
communication that they have with other surrounding regions.  Therefore, we can analyze how 
and to what extent spatial proximity and political geography play a role in the tactics of La 




In order to evaluate the differences between La Meute and Démocratie Nationale, 250 of 
the most recent posts from each group’s public Facebook group were analyzed in a number of 
categories. Posts were analyzed to determine whether the post was original content or shared 
from somewhere else; what is being shared; if the post shares from a journal or news source (if 
so, is it from the region, from the country, or neither); does the text in the post mention the group 
(DN or La Meute), the region (Wallonia/Brussels or Quebec), the country (Belgium or Canada), 
and/or another country (or Europe).  If any of these criteria were present, the post was given +1 
in the column for that criterion. Even if multiple instances of single criteria were present for the 
same post, only +1 was added. The sums of each column were calculated, as can be seen in 
Table	2 and Table	3.3 See Appendix A for further information about the data collection process.  
As previously discussed, thick descriptions allow us to uncover deeper, sub-surface 
meanings of these posts, we can still gain some valuable insights from the +1 qualitative system.  
Table 2: Number of Mentions in each Facebook Group per 250 posts.  
Group Own Group Own Region Own Country 
La Meute 126 83 43 
Démocratie Nationale 24 5 8 
 
As seen in Table	2, for the La Meute Facebook group, most of the posts are referencing 
their own party often about how immigrants are infiltrating their Quebec.  There is an element of 
individualism among the posts in La Meute. They mention their own group “La Meute” in 
126/250 posts (50.4%), whereas DN only mentioned their own group in 12/250 posts (5.6%).  La 
Meute also mentioned their own region and country at a much higher frequency than DN did: 
																																																								
3	Full data available upon request.		
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83/250 (33.2%) versus 5/250 (2%). This large difference furthers the idea that La Meute places 
more emphasis on posting about subjects related to their own party, region and country than DN.  
Table 3: Number of Mentions of Another Country or Europe in each Facebook Group per 
250 posts 
Group Other Country/Europe 
La Meute 24 
Démocratie Nationale 35 
 
Using the same +1 qualitative system Table	3 shows the totals for each group having a 
post that mentions another country or Europe. Unlike Table	2, Table	3 demonstrates that DN 
posts about other countries or Europe more than La Meute does. La Meute still occasionally 
mentions other countries in their posts. The intent for this category was to observe and determine 
the awareness of the actions of far-right groups in surrounding countries. However, the nature of 
the mentions is different between the two groups, so the reader should be cautioned as to their 
implications4.  
Qualitative measurements have supplied some essential, yet basic, information on the 
differences of what the two groups are posting about.  However, thick descriptions let us find 
more profound and insightful information, which might not be apparent through the qualitative 
methods. 
																																																								
4 See Appendix A 
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Image 4: La Meute Facebook Post from February 26, 20175 
 
 Image	4 demonstrates a common type of post on La Meute’s Facebook page that invites 
and pressures the group’s members to request to join the private La Meute page.  They state that 
the public page “is not enough” and that “you have to be part of the secret” page.  These types of 
posts are nonexistent on DN’s public page.  Even though both groups have private pages, La 
Meute uses many posts to convey the message that: in order to really be a member, you must join 
our private page.  This demonstrates the largely secretive and non-public sentiment of La Meute 
compared to DN.  
																																																								
5 Translation:  
Attention 
I would like to bring to your attention, dear members of the public page, that if you want to be part of the pack clans, 
the public pack is not enough. You have to be part of the secret Pack, which you must accept. 
Do not seek access to all clans but only that of your region please. 
P.S. If you are accepted in your clan watch to stay in the secret Pack, for we hold the list of members and we remove 
clans from anyone who is no longer in the pack. 




Image 5: Démocratie Nationale Facebook Post from October 8, 2017 
 
 
It is interesting to note that many of La Meute’s posts contain multiple grammatical and 
spelling errors.  The reasons for the errors is unknown but could be that the poster was careless, 
the poster is not educated on the correct grammar rules, or that the poster is purposefully making 
them in order to connect with a certain online audience.  However, considering the language and 
style of these posts, many seem to be written as a quick, emotionally-filled response. The nature 
of the group suggests that there is no editorial oversight, however, these errors would likely not 
turn away their following.  
 
By using thick descriptions, we see that Image	5 depicts a clearly anti-immigrant 
message being spread by DN, because the image contains a woman showing a thumbs-down 
gesture while touching graffiti on a wall that says “Welcome Refugees.”  It is apparent that the 
woman is in disagreement with this sentiment of welcoming refugees.   
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Image 6: Démocratie Nationale Facebook Post from August 21, 20176 
 
 
Since DN does not provide any additional text to this shared Facebook post, we can assume that 
DN feels the same sentiment about refugees as the woman.  An interesting aspect of Image	5 is 
that they are sharing content from Britain First’s Facebook page, a far right and ultranationalist 
political organization in Britain. La Meute rarely shares content from other far-right groups, 
which demonstrates DN’s greater connectivity with other far-right parties than La Meute.  
 
Although the post itself in Image	6 is their original content, DN is linking an article from 
RT about the Swedes rejecting refugee asylum seekers. The text that DN posted along with the 
article is congratulating the Swedes on their decision to reject asylum seekers. DN most likely 
shared this post, and many other similar news articles from other countries, in order to 
demonstrate that similarly minded individuals from around the world are acting on their beliefs 
																																																								
6	Translation: 
0 Tolerance! Congratulations to Sweden!	
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in order to make progress of their messages and ideas. Using perceived success stories from 
other countries uses these types of posts to inspire the DN Facebook page readers.  DN uses the 
opposite to foster emotions of outrage and anger.  They post links to news articles that 
demonstrates actions of foreign, non-far-right individuals that act not in accordance with their 
ideology, which are used to instill rage and action amongst their DN members.  
Image	7 demonstrates an article shared by the DN Facebook page, examines Calais, 
France in the aftermath of removing a tent-like village of refugees who were attempting to enter 
the United Kingdom.  The article by RT News speaks about clashes between fifty migrants and 
the police. DN is likely sharing this article in order to incite outrage amongst its readers and to 
paint the refugees in a negative and violent light. According to Media Bias/Fact Check, RT 
News has a right-center bias and although it publishes “factual information,” it “utilizes loaded 
words…to favor conservative causes” by “using appeal to emotion or stereotypes” (“RT News”).   




The fact that DN often shares from RT contributes to an echo chamber affect by only selecting 
sources that confirm their viewpoints.  
In the posts by DN that mention other countries, there is a large sense of camaraderie and 
collectiveness that demonstrates recognition of similarities amongst countries.  This phenomenon 
is not seen with La Meute. 
 Image	8 demonstrates this camaraderie by applauding a decision of increased border 
security in Hungary. DN writes, “Congratulations to our Hungarian friends.” The mentioning of 
“friends” indicates recognition of European unity with Hungary. By congratulating Hungary and 
referring to them as their friends, DN projects to their followers that they are on the winning side 
with Hungary in order to boost their perceived successes.  This tactic was never seen with La 
Meute.  





Congratulations to our Hungarian friends!	
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Image 9: Démocratie Nationale Facebook Post from August 22, 20178 
 
 
Although Image	9 criticizes France for decisions that they made regarding immigration, 
Démocratie Nationale writes, “Let us not make the same errors.” This wording evokes a 
sentiment that they realize they are similar to France and have enough shared qualities that they 
perceive themselves to be at risk in similar situations.  Posts like this one demonstrate that DN 
views other countries to be in the same class as them, and something that is an issue for another 
country could also be an issue for them. This sentiment continues the idea of interconnectivity. 
However, unlike Image	8, Image	9 has no mention of our French friends or anything similar.  
When DN is praising another country, they often refer to them as friends, comrades, or other 
terms of endearment. These actions help Démocratie Nationale unify the far-right groups and 





France had a card to play. They did not do it. This is the result. Let’s not make the same mistakes!	
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Image 10: Démocratie Nationale Facebook Post from August 18, 20179 
 
 
After the 2017 Barcelona attacks, DN posts (Image	10) about their sympathies and 
states, “We are Paris, We are Bruxelles [Brussels], We are Nice, We are Berlin, We are 
Barcelona,” further demonstrating their recognition of unity amongst the Europeans. 
Interestingly, La Meute did not post anything related to the attacks in Barcelona, nor was 
Barcelona ever mentioned in the La Meute data set.  This lack of acknowledgement of the attacks 
demonstrates the truly isolationistic and almost exclusively self-appreciation ideologies of La 
Meute in their Facebook posts.  
																																																								
9	Translation:  
We are saddened. We're bruised. We lost a fellow countryman in Barcelona, a family mother. 
We have had enough of the general hypocrisy of our policies. We are Paris, we are Brussels, we are Nice, we are 
Berlin, we are Barcelona &... &... &... &... 
It's time to end these fanatics. 
Our response will be commensurate with those acts that kill throughout Europe. 
People of Spain, our thoughts are with you. 
The difference is that our people are sincere! 
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Image 11: La Meute Facebook Post from October 6, 201710 
 
 
Image	11 exemplifies the mutual admiration and self-appreciating mentality of La Meute 
that is pervasive in a vast amount of their posts. La Meute’s posts, as demonstrated in Table	2 
and Image	11 do not address issues outside of their region or group. The posts often only relate 
to themselves in order to self-perpetuate their ideas of what it means to be a part of La Meute. 
The group rarely looks to or relates with groups outside of their Quebec/La Meute bubble.  
The data has demonstrated that Démocratie Nationale is much more inclined to share 
information with and work with other groups as compared to La Meute.  However, when 
examining the Facebook posts, one instance of La Meute cooperation with Storm Alliance, an 
anti-immigration group in Québec, was noted. On November 25, 2017, Storm Alliance and La 
																																																								
10 Translation:  
Be strong enough to defend yourself alone, remain authentic even if you are rejected, be wise enough to join La 
Meute 
When the time comes. You are not alone anymore.  
We are La Meute.	
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Meute “joined forces to organize a protest” for the first time (“CBC News”). The protest was 
arranged in order to protest the Liberal government, which they accused of being “too tolerant of 
the cultural practices of minorities” (“CBC News”). It is interesting to examine because of the 
unprecedented nature of La Meute’s communication and cooperation with another group. 
Although there exist differences between La Meute and Storm Alliance, the leader of Storm 
Alliance, said that he does not want to compete with other groups, but rather, “forge alliances 
with them,” because he believes that as far right groups, the “common denominator is the 
system” (Montpetit).  
 A quantitative analysis and thick descriptions used in tandem have allowed us to better 
differentiate the communication methods implemented by the La Meute and Démocratie 





 This thesis sought to examine a few different theories and objectives related to the role of 
distance and communication in far-right party connectivity. The data and evidence collected in 
the paper present some interesting analyses and implications.  250 of the most recent Facebook 
posts from December 31, 2017 were analyzed through counting pre-determined keywords of all 
of their posts as well as using critical discourse analysis and thick descriptions of individual 
posts. We can use this data to derive many implications from these results and reexamine the 
theories. The research question uses the two cases of La Meute and DN in order to address a 
larger discussion about the European Union and how far-right parties communicate within this 
supranational entity.  
Davey and Ebner found that far-right groups collaborate in order to achieve common 
goals, but they did not research what allows this global communication and how some far-right 
groups may have more advanced or intricate vehicles that allow this communication.  “The EU 
Brief” demonstrated goals of the EU that result in increased integration and connectivity 
amongst its member states.  
In analyzing these Facebook posts, it was found that La Meute is working in a much more 
isolated capacity, whereas DN is utilizing European networks in terms of sharing information.  
The theory that the EU has given platforms that have allowed a greater sense of unity and 
similitude amongst Europeans is confirmed.  
Bos and Van Der Brug explain that perceived legitimacy of party leaders is needed in 
order to have support.  As demonstrated by the sources of posting – DN use a unified approach 
by only posting from the DN page itself and La Meute uses a select few individual administrators 
to do the posting – both parties should have legitimacy because of perceived legitimacy of the 
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method in which someone is posting on the page.  In other words, the group’s supporters should 
perceive their respective party as being legitimate because either a) DN has a single poster 
conveying all of the information through posts (the page itself) or b) La Meute uses a small 
handful of administrators who have leadership positions in the party to do all of the posting. No 
analyses can be drawn about the effectiveness of having a single page posting versus multiple 
administrators, but, according to Bos and Van Der Brug, both pages have perceived legitimacy, 
since they do not allow any random individual to post. 
This paper theorized that La Meute does not have access to a supranational system that is 
a vehicle for connecting them with other surrounding parties, their Facebook posts on their 
public page will have significantly fewer postings that reference other countries and Europe. 
Conversely, according to this theory, DN would utilize their interconnectivity with other parties, 
and thus have more posts that relate to other countries and Europe.  The data confirms this theory 
in two ways. First, in the qualitative approach, DN posted about other countries and Europe at a 
higher frequency than La Meute.  Second, thick descriptions were used to highlight DN’s 
dialogue with other surrounding countries, which was not found in La Meute’s posts.  
This paper also theorized that the lack of connectivity of La Meute would result in more 
isolationist tactics and self-referential propaganda.  The inverse would then be true for DN; they 
have a large connectivity network, which would result in more cooperation with other similar 
parties.  The Facebook data confirms this theory in two ways. First, the qualitative system 
demonstrated that La Meute references themselves and their community at a much higher 
frequency than DN. Second, by using thick descriptions we found that La Meute had numerous 
posts that embody self-promotion of their group, which was rarely seen in DN’s posts.   
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La Meute often pressures their public Facebook group members to join their private page, 
which is not seen in DN’s public Facebook page. The nature of posting positions La Meute to be 
less in the public sphere and less accepted: perhaps more fearful of stating their views on a 
public platform.   
As noted by Doerr, far-right parties have used fear and resentment of immigrants in order 
to increase their presence.  This projected has supplied evidence that La Meute primarily focuses 
on Quebec-specific cases and issues in order to instill fear of foreigners.  DN also uses Wallonia- 
and Belgian-specific cases to create this fear. However, the main differing dependent variable is 
that DN also places focus on what is happening across Europe in order to instill fear, as 
demonstrated by the numerous articles shared from foreign sources as well as the number of 
mentions of other countries and Europe in their posts. The implication of these results is that DN 
is using the interconnectivity of the EU in order to utilize a large sample of cases Europe-wide to 
demonstrate their views.  This also gives more credibility to DN because as Doerr states, 
modernizing political discourse also increases the presence of far-right parties.  DN has 
modernized their political discourse by benefiting from using the advancements of Facebook, 
such as sharing content from other groups. These results further confirm the theory that La Meute 
will reference other countries less frequently than DN and the theory that La Meute’s Facebook 
posts will contain more examples of self-referencing than DN. 
Golder described that one of the grievances that creates a demand for far-right parties is 
modernization grievances, in which he explains the social-psychological reasoning that is 
“individuals who are unable to cope with rapid and fundamental societal change – the 
modernization losers – turn to the far right” (Golder 483). DN utilizes online communication to 
share and spread other far-right parties’ messages, as seen by the numerous posts they share on 
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Facebook from other European far-right groups. It is ironic that the interconnectivity system that 
was created as a result of EU integration is in fact the same vehicle used by far-right parties to 
promote their party. 
The unprecedented cooperation in November 2017 between La Meute and Storm 
Alliance would contradict a theory that says La Meute is acting exclusively on their own.  Even 
with this one instance, however, La Meute is still working much more independently than DN, 
who often mentions and shares information with other groups.  However, this is not to say that 
this rare cooperation on La Meute’s part should not be noted as a potential shift in their tactics.  
 Previous research has demonstrated in this field that far-right parties have adapted their 
tactics – like convergence and connectivity – in order to expand (Doerr); far-right party 
collaboration helps achieve common goals (Davey and Ebner); successful far-right party 
leadership can be at least partially credited by the creation of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality 
(Muis and Immerzeel) and by having members united behind a leader who embodies a common 
ideal (Lubbers, et al.); far-right parties appeal to a wide and diverse audience by exploiting 
communal grievances (Davey and Ebner); geographic proximity plays an important role between 
communication of different groups (Hoekman, et al.); sharing information on social media has 
helped far-right groups overcome cordon sanitaire (Littler and Feldman); and political 
geography affects communication networks (Kuss). 
 The role of the French language plays a large part in the discussion of the “us” versus 
“them” that is used by both groups. French is the minority language in both Canada and Belgium 
and is seen as a part of their culture that is already a point of contention. By using the French 
language almost exclusively in communication, this demonstrates that the groups are continuing 
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the “us” versus “them” tactic of only allowing those with knowledge of the French language to 
be a part of the debate.  
 Even though La Meute is a much newer far-right party than DN, both groups can be 
analyzed as groups in their infancy. DN had to completely re-brand themselves under a new 
name and logos, which increases the difficulty for previous supporters of the Belgian National 
Front to identify DN as the same group. Re-branding of a group might create confusion amongst 
far-right voters. For this reason, both groups can be perceived to be in their infancy, and thus 
they can be analyzed in a similar manner. Both groups are still growing and have the potential to 
further expand on their “us” versus “them” tactics.  
 The findings and visual data of this paper further demonstrate an “us” versus “them” 
mentality. This “us” versus “them” tactic is used to delegitimize those who are perceived to be 
working against their ideals. If these two groups can delegitimize counter-groups, it makes it 
much more difficult for outside views to persuade them of different ideals. By using the French 
language exclusively and painting everyone who is not them as part of the problem, they increase 
their power as an unchangeable group. Both groups have demonstrated that there are multiple 
“us’s” in their discussion. For both groups, the “us” may refer to the group itself, their region, or 
their country. However, with DN, they perceive the “us” as including much of Europe as well. 
DN is able to find commonalities in a larger “us” in order to utilize more examples of how the 
“them” is attacking and threatening the group, whereas La Meute focuses on a much smaller 
number of “us’s,” which is a result of a lack on interconnectivity of surrounding regions.  
This paper sheds new light on how the political geography of the EU, in the case of DN, 
leverages on-line communication and connectivity with other EU far-right party groups, whereas 
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groups like La Meute do not utilize these cross-national sharing opportunities because of a lack 
of a similar political geography.   
Although La Meute is not currently utilizing these diffusion-of-information connectivity 
opportunities, they have made progress in offline collaboration, in the case of the collaboration 
with the Soldiers of Odin. It will be interesting to see if this first step will create an increased 
online communication network between the two group’s Facebook pages. 
There were some shortcomings to this paper that need to be acknowledged. This project 
only looked at one EU far-right party’s online activity in order to draw broader conclusions.  
Also, there is merit in looking at other social media platforms, as well as private Facebook 
groups, in order to better understand the communication of far-right parties online.  
This research also only examined far-right Facebook activity in terms of political 





The positive outcomes of Europeanization and the integration of Europe have often been 
demonstrated. While there is much evidence to support this claim, it is important to also look at 
possible negative consequences of this connectivity.  If these EU networks allow more 
communication and connectivity among citizens, this should hold true for far-right parties that 
propagate anti-immigration and nationalistic messages. This research has confirmed this notion. 
 As demonstrated by this research, we have seen that there may exist some negative 
impacts of European integration.  One of these that is highlighted is that far-right parties can also 
profit from the political geography resulting from European integration in order to communicate 
and spread their messages with other far-right parties. This research allows us to analyze some 
ways in which far-right parties navigate this connectivity. I have demonstrated that they use 
unreliable sources to prove points; they often use anecdotal cases without much, if any, scholarly 
research to support it. This research can be used to educate individuals about being critical 
readers and to not fall victim to some of these false claims. European lawmakers and leaders can 
discredit some of the far-right parties’ arguments and attempt to use logic and critical reading to 
dismantle some of their faulty ideologies. Davey and Ebner warn that far-right parties will 
continue to increase in online platforms – which results in more offline activism – if “novel 
counter-strategies are not developed.” Given the implications from this paper, in order to combat 
the rise of far-right parties, new counter-strategies must be developed in the age of cross-national 
social media communication.  
The EU serves as a conduit for the DN, whereas La Meute does not have this type of 
supranational entity to help diffuse information and feel connected with others. In the age of the 
Internet, parties can diffuse their messages across political and geographic barriers.  In this study, 
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proximity and access to vehicles of communication – such as the EU- should not matter, 
however it still does for La Meute. The case of La Meute collaborating for the first time with 
another far-right party, Soldiers of Odin, might shed light on a transformation of the tactics of La 
Meute. The broader implication of this is that even if a party is not currently utilizing 
collaboration with other parties to diffuse their message, this research demonstrates that as the 
party continues, they may adopt some of these new interconnectivity tactics and find common 
political geography with similar minded groups.  
This research has demonstrated that La Meute and DN both utilize an “us” versus “them” 
mentality when communicating with their followers. This finding is important because it can 
help policy-makers better address the threats that these groups might currently have or have in 
the future. Policy-makers can use vigilance in monitoring these groups that might someday pose 
greater and greater threats to their populations. Individuals in power in these two regions can 
work to delegitimize the arguments put forth by these far-right groups.  
In an age where social networks and online communication is growing, it is important for 
scholars to look past just party platforms, speeches and in-person communication and 
recognition of other groups in their party family. Public social media postings by parties can shed 
light on what supporters and opponents – as well as those who do not have a stance but what to 
learn about a party – view on a daily basis, without ever leaving their homes. Research into 
private Facebook groups help uncover more of the inner-workings of far-right parties.  This 
study only focused on what these groups convey – intentionally or not – to the public.    
Identifying some of the shortcomings of this project opens the avenues for future 
research.  Just because DN is sharing other groups’ posts does not mean that other groups were 
sharing DN’s posts. Evidence of mutual sharing would present a stronger conclusion about DN’s 
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communication in the EU far-right party political geography. Studying the sharing trends of 
more than one group would allow researchers to be more certain about the findings of this paper. 
On a similar point, La Meute does not share other group’s posts. Therefore, a stronger argument 
could be made if it was demonstrated that other groups are also not sharing La Meute’s posts. 
This raises the question of mutual Facebook post sharing among far-right parties in Canada and 
how potential cooperation among Canadian far-right groups might lead to new insights in this 
field of research.  
Sometimes closeness and connectivity might not always have positive repercussions. 
This research suggests that this is the case and provides a valid first step in looking at the 
interconnectivity of far-right parties. Further research will help tighten and strengthen the 
argument.  Looking at the bigger picture of the EU and how far-right parties exploit its 
communication networks can give insights to legislators, other parties, and individuals about 
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Appendix A: Data Collection Criteria 
In order to identify the differences between the two group’s Facebook posts, as well as 
how the data explains the communication of the parties, we must acknowledge how gauging 
these criteria can potentially be misleading.  This discrepancy exists because of the ways in 
which La Meute and DN would both receive a +1 for a category, yet they are presenting 
information in two vastly different ways. Let us compare Image	12 and Image	13. 
 
Image 12: La Meute Facebook Post from September 7, 201711 
 
																																																								
11 Translation:  
When it comes from Muslims themselves... 
This time we won't be able to blame the pack. Even Muslims are against the course of ECR... because it is a creation of 
political Islam, the fundamentalist Islam of Saudi Arabia. We're not saying that. 
Please share as much as possible. 
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Image 13: Démocratie Nationale Facebook Post from September 1, 201712 
 
 
Image	12 is a post that shares a Facebook video in which a member of La Meute 
comments, “When it comes to Muslims themselves…” and continues to talk about the creation 
of a political Islam, which is described as “the fundamentalist Islam of Saudi Arabia.” Image	12 
therefore received +1 in the category of “Mentions another Country” since Saudi Arabia is 
mentioned. However, this was not the original intent of the “Mention Another Country” or 
“Mention Europe” category.  Differing from Image	12, Image	13 explains recent actions of the 
Hungarian Prime Minister and congratulates his actions by exclaiming, “Long live Hungary!” 
																																																								
12 Translation:  
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán sent a letter to the European commission calling for 440 million Euros for 
protecting Europe from the flow of illegal migrants. 
It costs a lot of people's mistakes! It is not Hungary that must be blamed but all those parasites that let them invade. 
Long Live Hungary! 
	
 65 
Image	13 explicitly address the situation in Hungary and thus also received a +1 in the category 
of “Mentions Another Country.” The difference between the two posts is that Image	12 just 
mentions a foreign country in order to give a technical, nonessential detail in furthering a point, 
whereas Image	13 is using the situation in Hungary to draw similarities between Belgium and 
Hungary in order to further the party’s beliefs.  These two examples are presented to demonstrate 
the differences in the ways that the La Meute post and the DN post would both qualify for +1 in 
“Mentions Another Country” even though La Meute is not mentioning another country in order 
to draw a connection with another country like DN is in their post.  The reader should be 
cautioned that although both groups receive a +1, they do not have identical implementation of 
“Mentions Another Country.”  
 
